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BITING THE HAND THAT FEEDS: HOW 
TRADEMARK PROTECTION MIGHT 
THREATEN SCHOOL SPIRIT  
I. INTRODUCTION 
There is money to be made in collegiate athletics, both by the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and by member schools.  The NCAA 
and member schools can, and do, take in billions of dollars annually from the 
sale of merchandise bearing their names and logos. FF1FF  Millions of students, 
alumni, and fans follow college sports.  They flock to stadiums on game day 
and congregate to watch games on television.  Most of these fans will adorn 
themselves in school spirit—T-shirts, hats, and just about anything else 
bearing the school colors and logos—to show their support of their school.   
Merchandising companies know about the potential profits to be made 
from NCAA and university logos as well.  NCAA universities have long had 
to deal with merchandising companies using school logos and color schemes 
without authorization.  For probably just as long, students at these universities 
have made T-shirts and other memorabilia using school slogans, logos, and 
color schemes to show their school pride or provide social commentary.  What 
happens if these students begin selling these items, either to the general public, 
students on campus, or within student organizations?  Student organizations 
from the University of Texas FF2FF and the University of Kansas FF3FF have recently 
come under scrutiny for unauthorized use of university trademarks.  A painter, 
an alumnus of the University of Alabama, was brought to court for depicting 
the Alabama football team in game scenarios, complete with the Crimson 
Tide‟s signature colors and logo.FF4FF  As NCAA universities grow increasingly 
more protective over their trademarked property, these universities may begin 
taking a closer look at this practice. 
 
1. Gerald T. Tschura, Likelihood of Confusion and Expressive Functionality: A Fresh Look at the 
Ornamental Use of Institutional Colors, Names and Emblems on Apparel and Other Goods, 53 
WAYNE L. REV. 873, 875 (2007). 
2. Lauren Reinlie, Longhorn Logo Policy Under Review, DAILY TEXAN (Univ. Tex.-Austin) via 
U-Wire, Sept. 26, 2002, available at http://www.dailytexanonline.com/2.8480/longhorn-logo-policy-
under-review-1.1261255. 
3. Obama T-shirt Concerns KU, TOPEKA CAPITAL-JOURNAL, July 22, 2008, at 1. 
4. David Magee, Calling Foul on Alabama Lawsuit, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Nov. 
15, 2006, at B2. 
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This Comment will examine the potential liability that may arise when 
students or student groups use university trademarks for their own purposes.  
Part II will discuss the background of trademark law to lay a foundation for 
the analysis that will follow.  It will focus on what can be trademarked under 
the Lanham Act, what causes of action exist for universities under the Lanham 
Act, and what defenses exist for potential infringers.  Part III will explore the 
application of trademark law to NCAA university trademarks.  Part IV will 
explore the tendencies of NCAA universities to sue over the infringing use of 
their marks.  Part V will explore the possibility of universities bringing legal 
action against students and student-made merchandise, along with the 
potential success of these actions, and part VI will examine possible defenses 
for these students.  Finally, part VII will conclude that, although universities 
may very well succeed should they choose to bring claims, there are viable 
defenses available and public policy seems to favor the students. 
II. THE LANHAM ACT AND THE BACKGROUND OF TRADEMARK LAW 
Before examining NCAA trademarks and the potential liability for student 
uses, this section will explore the foundations of trademark law.  Trademarks 
are integral to commerce in the United States. FF5FF  By giving certain marks 
protection from use by others, trademark law protects consumers by allowing 
them to choose goods in the marketplace with a reasonable confidence in 
knowing where the product originated.FF6FF  The mark identifies the product‟s 
source for the consumer.FF7FF  In turn, trademark owners receive the benefit of the 
prevention of unauthorized use, which protects the mark holder‟s reputation in 
the marketplace and protects the holder from potential economic loss from 
goods purporting to be theirs.FF8FF  Hence, underlying trademark law is the 
symbiotic protection of both the consumer and the trademark holder.FF9FF  
This section will explore the building blocks of trademark law, which will 
lay the groundwork for the protectability of university trademarks.  This 
section‟s analysis will include (a) protectability and infringement; (b) third 
party liability for infringement in the form of vicarious or contributory 
liability;FF10FF (c) the elements of protectable trade dress; (d) the ability to 
 
5. Patrick E. Boland, Wrongful Assault on the Trademark System, 1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
153, 164 n.40 (1987).  
6. Jeremiah Kline, Black and Blue: An Examination of Trademarking University Color Schemes, 
16 SPORTS LAW. J. 47, 49 (2009). 
7. Id.  
8. Tschura, supra note 1, at 875. 
9. Id. at 876. 
10. Deborah F. Buckman, Liability as Vicarious or Contributory Infringer Under the Lanham 
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trademark colors; and (e) available defenses to trademark infringement. 
A. Protection and Infringement 
Federal trademark protection is provided by the Lanham Act, which states  
[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or 
services . . . uses in commerce any word, term, name, 
symbol . . . or any combination thereof . . . which [i]s likely to 
cause confusion . . . or to deceive as to the affiliation, 
connection . . . or as to the origin, sponsorship or approval of 
his or her goods . . . shall be liable in a civil action by any 
person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be 
damaged by such act.FF11 
To receive protection under the Lanham Act, a mark must be used in interstate 
commerce, it must be distinctive, and it cannot be barred from federal 
trademark registration under section 1052 of the Lanham Act. FF12FF  These 
requirements must be present whether the mark is federally registered or not 
because, to pursue an infringement action, the mark holder must show that 
“the trademark is valid . . . by showing either that the mark is registered at the 
federal level or that the mark has been used in interstate commerce and is 
distinctive.”FF13FF  Further, to prove infringement, the trademark owner must 
show three things: (1) that the mark is distinctive, (2) that the “infring[ing] use 
will likely cause consumer confusion,” and (3) the mark owner must overcome 
the functionality doctrine by showing the use is not infringing on a functional 
feature.FF14FF   
1. Distinctiveness and Types of Marks. 
Initially, a court must determine whether the mark is distinctive. FF15FF  In 
determining a mark‟s distinctiveness, a court will first have to decide which 
 
Act –Modern Cases, 152 A.L.R. Fed. 573 (2009). 
11. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1125(a) (2010). 
12. SHUBHA GHOSH ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRIVATE RIGHTS, THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST, AND THE REGULATION OF CREATIVE ACTIVITY 463 (2007).  Section 1052 of the Lanham 
Act lists various marks that cannot be registered, such as marks that are immoral or deceptive, depict 
a living person without his or her consent, etc.  Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1052 (2010). 
13. GHOSH, supra note 12, at 464.   
14. Kline, supra note 6, at 50. 
15. Id. 
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category of distinctiveness the mark fits. FF16FF  There are four categories of 
marks: (1) generic, (2) arbitrary or fanciful, (3) suggestive, and (4) 
descriptive.FF17FF   
a. Generic Marks.FF18 
Generic marks are afforded the least protection because they merely 
“refer[] to the genus or class of which a particular product is a member and 
[therefore] can never be protected.”FF19FF  A generic mark does not distinguish a 
particular product and, therefore, does not merit protection. FF20FF  An example is 
the term “Aspirin,” which was originally a mark held by the Bayer 
Corporation but was held to be a generic term because it merely referred to a 
class of pain relievers.FF21FF  
b. Arbitrary or Fanciful Marks 
On the opposite end of the spectrum from generic marks are arbitrary or 
fanciful marks, which are inherently distinctive and, therefore, entitled to 
protection.FF22FF  No additional proof is needed to establish the distinctiveness of 
these marks.FF23FF  Arbitrary and fanciful marks are similar in that they are both 
entirely unrelated to the product, but “the two differ, however, in that a mark 
qualifies as arbitrary if it is well-known in a different context, and fanciful if it 
is newly invented.”FF24FF  Arbitrary or fanciful marks are always protected 
because they intrinsically identify a particular source. FF25FF  An example of an 
arbitrary mark is “Apple,” referring to a brand of computer, because it applies 
a word that has no particular relation to computers.  An example of a fanciful 
mark is “Kodak,” referring to a brand of film or camera, because the term was 
created for the product. 
 
16. Id. at 51. 
17. Alderman v. Iditarod Props., 32 P.3d 373, 382 (Alaska 2001); see also Kline, supra note 6, at 
51. 
18. This Comment will not look at generic marks because university color schemes and logos are 
generally going to be seen as at least descriptive marks.  A university‟s name or logo likely will not 
refer to the genus or class of product that it is a part of. 
19. Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc. v. SanGiacomo N.A. Ltd., 187 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir. 1999). 
20. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 531 n.7 (1987). 
21. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 510-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). 
22. Ashley Furniture, 187 F.3d at 369 (quoting Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 
763, 768 (1992)). 
23. Kline, supra note 6, at 51. 
24. Ashley Furniture, 187 F.3d at 369. 
25. Id.  
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c. Suggestive Marks 
Suggestive marks are also inherently distinctive. FF26FF  These marks do not 
describe the product but instead imply or suggest the product. FF27FF  Suggestive 
marks “require[] imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as 
to the nature of the goods.”FF28FF  A three-part test has been laid out to 
differentiate a suggestive mark from a descriptive mark: “(i) whether the 
purchaser must use some imagination to connect the mark to some 
characteristic of the product; (ii) whether competitors have used the term 
descriptively or rather as a trademark; and (iii) whether the proposed use 
would deprive competitors of a way to describe their goods.” FF29FF  An example 
of a suggestive mark is the term “Gleem” for a brand of toothpaste because the 
term requires the consumer to cognitively connect the toothpaste to the image 
of clean, “gleaming” teeth.FF30 
d. Descriptive Marks 
On the spectrum of protection, arbitrary or fanciful marks and suggestive 
marks are inherently distinctive, while generic marks are not distinctive. FF31FF  
Between the marks that are inherently distinctive and the marks that are 
generic lie descriptive marks.FF32FF  Descriptive marks are characterized by the 
fact that they describe a feature of the product. FF33FF  Descriptive marks are not 
inherently distinctive and, as a result, do not gain automatic protection. FF34FF  To 
be protectable under the Lanham Act, a descriptive mark must acquire 
secondary meaning.FF35FF  University logos or other indicia, along with their color 
schemes, will likely be placed in this category, which will then necessitate a 
finding of secondary meaning.FF36FF  
Secondary meaning is a meaning that a mark takes on through time or, put 
 
26. Kline, supra note 6, at 52. 
27. Alderman v. Iditarod Props., 32 P.3d 373, 383 (Alaska 2001). 
28. Kline, supra note 6, at 52 (quoting Stix Prods. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., 295 F. Supp. 479, 
488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)). 
29. Menashe v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 412, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
30. B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 252 F.3d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 2001). 
31. Kline, supra note 6, at 51. 
32. Id. 
33. Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc. v. SanGiacomo N.A. Ltd., 187 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir. 1999). 
34. See id. 
35. Id. 
36. See Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 475 (5th Cir. 
2008). 
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another way, when a merely descriptive term takes on a meaning identifiable 
with the product over time. FF37FF  Secondary meaning is achieved when 
consumers in the marketplace correlate the mark with a single source or 
origin.FF38FF  A mark achieves secondary meaning when a consumer can see a 
product on the shelf and immediately recognize where it came from. FF39FF  When 
a descriptive mark obtains secondary meaning, it is protected. FF40FF  In other 
words, although arbitrary or fanciful marks and suggestive marks receive 
protection because they are inherently distinctive, secondary meaning is what 
makes a descriptive mark distinctive and, therefore, is what gives a merely 
descriptive mark the requisite distinctiveness to be protected by trademark 
law.FF41 
2.  Likelihood of Confusion. 
After determining the distinctiveness of a mark, the trademark holder also 
must show that “the infringed use will likely cause consumer confusion.” FF42FF  
There is no single test for likelihood of confusion. FF43FF  However, although 
courts use different tests, there is a common ground of similar elements.FF44FF  
Alderman v. Iditarod Properties, Inc. set out a clear likelihood of confusion 
analysis.FF45FF  Although the court was analyzing state law, it noted that “[s]tate 
statutes modeled after the Lanham Act also use the same likelihood-of-
confusion test.”FF46FF  The test was put forth as follows: “An appreciable number 
of reasonable buyers must be likely to be confused by the names for trade 
name [or trademark] infringement or unfair trade practice liability.” FF47FF  
“Appreciable number” was loosely described, but it does not appear that a 
majority of confused customers is necessary. FF48FF  “Likely” is understood to 
mean probable, not just possible.FF49FF  “Confusion” is said to include confusion 
 
37. Alderman v. Iditarod Props., 32 P.3d 373, 386 (Alaska 2001). 
38. Kline, supra note 6, at 52. 
39. Id. at 53. 
40. Id.  
41. See id. 
42. Id. at 50.   
43. Id. at 53-54. 
44. Id. at 54.   
45. Alderman v. Iditarod Props., 32 P.3d 373, 390 (Alaska 2001). 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
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at the point of sale, post-sale, pre-sale, and reverse confusion.FF50FF  This 
encompasses confusion as to origin and also to “affiliation, connection, or 
association.”FF51FF  Among the ways to show a likelihood of confusion, other than 
evidence of actual consumer confusion, are survey evidence and an “argument 
based on a clear inference arising from a comparison of the conflicting marks 
and the context of their use.”FF52 
There are several tests that different courts use, but the factors used by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit are similar to what many 
courts use.FF53FF  These factors, none of which is determinative by itself, are 
derived from the Restatement of Torts:  
1. strength of the mark; 2. proximity of the goods; 3. 
similarity of the marks; 4. evidence of actual confusion; 5. 
marketing channels used; 6. type of goods and the degree of 
care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; 7. defendant‟s 
intent in selecting the mark; and 8. likelihood of expansion of 
the product lines.FF54FF   
Evidence of actual confusion is, of course, a strong indicator of likelihood of 
confusion.FF55 
3.  Functionality. 
Third, a mark holder must overcome the functionality doctrine by showing 
the use is not infringing on a functional feature. FF56FF  A trademark cannot be 
protected if the mark consists of a functional aspect of the product or part of 
what makes the product work.FF57FF  By creating this bar, the Lanham Act ensures 
that a producer of a product cannot gain a monopoly over a product‟s useful 
feature, which may only be done under patent law.FF58FF  Two main purposes of 
 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 391. 
53. Id.  See Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 478 (5th 
Cir. 2008); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 224 (3d Cir. 2005); Rust 
Env‟t & Infrastructure, Inc. v. Teunissen, 131 F.3d 1210, 1216 (7th Cir. 1997); S.P.A. Esercizio v. 
Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1242 (6th Cir. 1991); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elec. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 
495 (2d Cir. 1961). 
54. Alderman, 32 P.3d at 391. 
55. Id. at 392. 
56. Kline, supra note 6, at 50. 
57. Id. at 54. 
58. Id. 
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the functionality doctrine have been put forth. FF59FF  The first is to promote 
competition by allowing a product‟s useful features to be copied to allow for 
advancement of products.FF60FF  The second is that the functionality doctrine 
prevents trademark law from interfering with patent law by not allowing a 
person to gain a longer monopoly over a product‟s useful features than what 
patent law would allow.FF61 
If the mark holder satisfies all the requirements to get protection under the 
Lanham Act, the protection will last “as long as the owner continually uses the 
mark and the mark retains its secondary meaning.” FF62FF  If the mark holder can 
show that the mark is distinctive, that the infringing use will likely cause 
confusion, and that the use is not infringing on a functional feature, the owner 
will likely be able to get a court to find an infringement of the trademark. FF63 
B. Vicarious and Contributory Liability 
If the mark holder can establish the mark‟s validity, liability for trademark 
infringement can extend to other parties in the form of contributory liability or 
vicarious liability.FF64FF  Contributory liability occurs when a party intentionally 
assists another in infringing but does not actually have power over the party 
who is directly infringing.FF65FF  The United States Supreme Court has described 
contributory liability as follows:  
[I]f a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another 
to infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product 
to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in 
trademark infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is 
contributorily responsible for any harm done as a result of the 
deceit.FF66 
As a result, there may potentially be contributory liability when a party has 
been warned of its infringing activities but continues them anyway. FF67FF   
 
59. Wilhelm Pudenz v. Littlefuse, Inc., 177 F.3d 1204, 1207 (11th Cir. 1999). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Kline, supra note 6, at 55. 
63. Id. at 50. 
64. Buckman, supra note 10. 
65. Id. at 586-87. 
66. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). 
67. Id. 
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Vicarious liability is an indirect liability. FF68FF  It differs from contributory 
liability in that “[i]t is the attribution of a wrongdoer‟s actions to an innocent 
third party by virtue of their relationship.”FF69FF  Vicarious liability for trademark 
infringement grew out of vicarious liability in torts, which is based on the 
relationship between joint tortfeasors who are thought to be in such a 
relationship that the actions of one bind the other to the same action.FF70FF  
Because of the relationship between the parties, one party who may have no 
direct involvement with the infringement of the mark may be held liable for a 
“partner‟s” infringement.FF71FF  Also, vicarious liability may arise under the tort 
theory of respondeat superior, where an employer or principal may be held 
vicariously liable for infringement by an employee or agent acting on the 
behalf of the employer or principal.FF72FF  Under these two theories, if the 
relationships between parties are sufficient, a court may find infringement by a 
party who either did not directly infringe on the mark or who knowingly 
assisted another party in infringement.FF73 
Both of these secondary liability theories are well illustrated by Microsoft 
Corp. v. Ram Distribution, LLC, which involved a corporation that sold 
computer hardware and software over the Internet. FF74FF  The corporation had 
purchased several Microsoft software programs, both from Microsoft 
authorized resellers and from “gray market” sellers. FF75FF  Ram did not inspect the 
purchased programs to determine if they were counterfeit. FF76FF  Even after 
receiving notice that they might be selling counterfeit programs, Ram 
continued to sell the software.FF77FF  Although the court focused on Microsoft‟s 
motion for summary judgment, which was denied, the court stated that the 
owner of Ram could be held liable for both vicarious and contributory 
trademark infringement if Microsoft could prove that Ram had infringed 
Microsoft‟s trademarks.FF78FF  The court stated that the owner “had the ability to 
supervise the infringing activity” and, as owner, stood to profit from the sale 
 
68. Buckman, supra note 10, at 589. 
69. Id. at 589-90. 
70. Id. at 590. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Microsoft Corp. v. Ram Distribution, LLC, 625 F. Supp. 2d 674, 678 (E.D. Wis. 2008). 
75. Id.  
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 679. 
78. Id. at 682, 684. 
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of the software.FF79FF  The court also made a point of noting that the owner had 
knowingly directed the company toward selling software purchased in a 
market that ran a high risk of counterfeiting.FF80 
C. Trade Dress 
It could be argued that university color schemes, and possibly logos, are 
trade dress.  Like trademarks, trade dress is also protected under the Lanham 
Act.FF81FF  Trade dress is a product‟s packaging or design, which may be 
protectable under the Lanham Act if it achieves secondary meaning and meets 
other requirements.FF82FF  The requirements for trade dress to gain protection are 
basically the same as the requirements for trademarks because both theories of 
protection are borne out of the same provision of the Lanham Act. FF83FF   
Importantly, a party asserting trade dress infringement will have to show 
that the use is not infringing on a functional feature of the product. FF84FF  This can 
be difficult because courts have been wary about over-extending the protection 
of trade dress.FF85FF  Because the design of a product “almost invariably serves 
purposes other than source identification,” it can be difficult to differentiate 
not only functional features but also the distinctiveness of the trade dress. FF86FF   
D. Trademarking Colors 
Not only has the Lanham Act extended protection to trade dress, but 
colors have also been found to be protectable under trademark law. FF87FF  In 
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., the United States Supreme Court 
determined that colors can satisfy an important element of a protectable 
trademark, namely that the colors are intended to be used “to identify and 
distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those 
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if 
that source is unknown.”FF88FF  The Qualitex Court found that there was no 
 
79. Id. at 684. 
80. Id. at 684-85. 
81. Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28 (2001).  See 15 U.S.C.S. § 
1125(a)(1)(A) (2010). 
82. Traffix Devices, 532 U.S. at 28. 
83. Id. at 28-29.   
84. Id. at 29. 
85. Id.  
86. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000). 
87. Kline, supra note 6, at 55. 
88. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1127 (2010); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 
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“obvious theoretical objection to the use of color alone as a trademark.” FF89FF  
Colors are not inherently distinctive and, consequently, will have to attain 
secondary meaning in order to be protectable.FF90FF  If a color or combination of 
colors can attain secondary meaning, it would seem to be in keeping with the 
underlying policy of trademark law to limit consumer confusion because, if a 
consumer identifies a particular color scheme with a particular source, then the 
requisite recognition for distinctiveness is met. FF91FF   
The Qualitex Court similarly could not find an objection to colors being 
protectable under trademark law in respect to the functionality doctrine. FF92FF  
The Court stated that 
[a]lthough sometimes color plays an important role (unrelated 
to source identification) in making a product more desirable, 
sometimes it does not.  And, this latter fact—the fact that 
sometimes color is not essential to a product‟s use or purpose 
and does not affect cost or quality—indicates that the doctrine 
of “functionality” does not create an absolute bar to the use of 
color alone as a mark.FF93 
Colors then can sometimes meet the requirements to be protected by 
trademark law, which had generally been regarded to protect words or 
symbols.FF94FF  The Court broke down the requirements for a word or symbol to 
be qualified as a trademark as “(1) a „symbol,‟ (2) „use[d] . . . as a mark,‟ (3) 
„to identify and distinguish the seller‟s goods from goods made or sold by 
others,‟ but that it not be „functional.‟” FF95FF  Four arguments were presented in 
Qualitex against allowing trademark law to cover colors. FF96FF  The first was that 
trademarking colors would cause confusion in the courts about shades of 
colors, which would basically create a line drawing problem as to what shades 
of particular colors competitors could or could not use. FF97FF  The Court 
responded to this argument by pointing out that courts frequently have to make 
 
162 (1995). 
89. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163. 
90. Id. at 162-63. 
91. Id. at 163-64. 
92. Id. at 164. 
93. Id. at 165. 
94. Id. at 166. 
95. Id. 
96. Kline, supra note 6, at 56-57. 
97. Id. at 56. 
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decisions like this and could use “existing legal standards” to make decisions 
on a case-by-case basis.FF98 
 The second argument against allowing trademark law to cover colors was 
that protection would “deplete the available color supply.” FF99FF  The Court 
responded to this argument by stating that this probably would not come up, 
but if it did, the functionality doctrine would act to prevent further protection 
in that area.FF100 
 The third argument was that precedent would not allow for the trademark 
protection of colors.FF101FF  However, the Court found that this argument was 
based on cases that analyzed trademark law that predated the Lanham Act and 
that the subsequent “amendments to the Act clearly changed its intent.”FF102 
The last argument raised was that color, by itself, did not need Lanham 
Act protection.FF103FF  The Court found that “though certain types of trade dress 
already obtain protection, companies may want to indicate the source of their 
product by only using a color.”FF104FF  In the end, the Court found that “[i]t is the 
source-distinguishing ability of a mark—not its ontological status as color, 
shape, fragrance, word, or sign—that permits it to serve these basic purposes 
[to be covered by the Lanham Act].”FF105FF  Further, the Court stated that, 
because trademark law allowed protection to a descriptive word with 
secondary meaning, the law should allow a color protection if it too acquired 
secondary meaning.FF106FF  In the end, the Court held colors to be protectable but 
only when they had acquired secondary meaning.FF107 
E. Defenses 
The most important defense to trademark infringement is probably the 
doctrine of fair use.FF108FF  There are two types of fair use: classic fair use and 
nominative fair use.FF109FF  Classic fair use applies when a “defendant uses the 
 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 57. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995). 
106. Id. at 163. 
107. Id. at 166. 
108. See generally William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 
51-53 (2008). 
109. Horphag Research Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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plaintiff‟s mark to describe the defendant‟s own product.” FF110FF  Nominative fair 
use occurs when the defendant references the plaintiff‟s mark to describe the 
defendant‟s product.FF111FF  To have a classic fair use defense, a defendant must 
be able to show that the mark was used descriptively, not as a mark, fairly, and 
in good faith.FF112FF   
A test for nominative fair use was set out in Century 21 Real Estate Corp. 
v. Lendingtree, Inc.FF113FF  First, the court determined the likelihood of confusion 
and then applied a three-prong test to determine nominative fair use:  
(1) Is the use of the plaintiff‟s mark necessary to describe both 
plaintiff‟s product or service and defendant‟s product or 
service? (2) Is only so much of the plaintiff‟s mark used as is 
necessary to describe plaintiff‟s products or services? (3) 
Does the defendant‟s conduct or language reflect the true and 
accurate relationship between plaintiff and defendant‟s 
products or services?FF114 
If the answer to all three questions is “yes,” then there is nominative fair use 
and no infringement.FF115FF  The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit has since stated that the nominative fair use defense is available when 
two criteria, similar to the three listed above, are met: “[T]he defendant (1) 
may only use so much of the mark as necessary to identify the product or 
service and (2) may not do anything that suggests affiliation, sponsorship, or 
endorsement by the markholder.”FF116 
A defendant may also avoid infringement by showing expressive use, 
although there has been some conflict in this area of the law. FF117FF  An 
expressive use of a trademark “convey[s] an articulable message rather than, 
or in addition to, the traditional function of source identification.”FF118FF  
Allowing expressive use seems to also conform with First Amendment 
freedom of speech because expressive uses are often meant to criticize or put 
 
110. Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 214 (3d Cir. 2005). 
111. Id. 
112. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1115(b)(4) (2010). 
113. Century 21, 425 F.3d at 232. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 489 (5th Cir. 
2008) (quoting Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 546 (5th Cir. 1998)). 
117. See generally McGeveran, supra note 108, at 56-59. 
118. Id. at 54. 
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forth a new idea.FF119 
Expressive functionality may be a fair use, but there is also an argument 
that all “ornamental use of institutional names and insignia[s] on many 
products, apparel products in particular, is a functional use of the mark, and 
therefore, cannot be protected in that context [under trademark law].” FF120FF  
Further, the argument asserts that enjoining others from using these names and 
insignias would be “the equivalent of an unwarranted monopoly.” FF121 
III. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS FOR LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY V. SMACK 
APPAREL CO.: THE LANHAM ACT APPLIED TO NCAA TRADEMARKS 
With the foundation of trademark law in place, this Comment will now 
turn to the application of trademark law to NCAA trademarks.  Universities 
have been able to garner protection for combinations of color schemes and 
logos under the Lanham Act.FF122FF  In Board of Supervisors for Louisiana State 
University v. Smack Apparel Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit held that university color schemes and logos are protectable 
under the Lanham Act because “team colors and logos are, in the minds of 
fans and other consumers, source indicators of team-related apparel.”FF123FF  
Several NCAA universities brought this case to sue an apparel 
manufacturer.FF124FF  The apparel manufacturer manufactured T-shirts using the 
colors and logos from several NCAA universities that were participating in 
college football post-season bowl games.FF125FF  The T-shirts used the logos and 
colors from these schools with text pertaining to the bowl game that the school 
was participating in.FF126FF  The T-shirts were sold online and to vendors, which 
led to the merchandise being sold right next to officially licensed 
merchandise.FF127 
The court adopted a seven-factor test to determine if the university color 
schemes and logos had obtained secondary meaning. FF128FF  The factors were as 
follows:  
 
119. See generally id. at 56-59. 
120. Tschura, supra note 1, at 887. 
121. Id. at 889. 
122. Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 488-89 (5th 
Cir. 2008); Kline, supra note 6, at 50. 
123. Smack, 550 F.3d at 478. 
124. Id. at 471-72. 
125. Id. at 472. 
126. Id. at 472-73. 
127. Id. at 472. 
128. Id. at 476. 
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(1) length and manner of use of the mark or trade dress, (2) 
volume of sales, (3) amount and manner of advertising, (4) 
nature of use of the mark or trade dress in newspapers and 
magazines, (5) consumer-survey evidence, (6) direct 
consumer testimony, and (7) the defendant‟s intent in copying 
the trade dress.FF129FF   
The court found that the university color schemes and logos had acquired 
secondary meaning because the universities had used the colors for over a 
century, had used them on “all manner of materials, including brochures, 
media guides, and alumni materials,” and had sold merchandise using their 
colors and logos that brought in tens of millions of dollars per year. FF130 
The court then used a seven-factor inquiry to determine the likelihood of 
confusion.FF131FF  The factors were as follows:  
(1) the type of mark allegedly infringed, (2) the similarity 
between the two marks, (3) the similarity of the products or 
services, (4) the identity of the retail outlets and purchasers, 
(5) the identity of the advertising media used, (6) the 
defendant‟s intent, and (7) any evidence of actual 
confusion.FF132FF   
In this case, the plaintiff universities‟ marks were very strong because they had 
been used for a long period of time and were readily identifiable, the 
defendant admitted it intended to use the colors and logos to identify its 
products with a particular school, the defendant‟s products were very similar 
to the universities‟ products, and the products were sold directly in areas 
where officially licensed merchandise was sold.FF133FF  
Smack Apparel also seemed to eliminate the argument that university 
logos and colors are functional and, therefore, not protectable under the 
Lanham Act.FF134FF  The apparel manufacturer argued that university logos and 
color schemes were functional because they were used in ways not solely 
intended to identify the school as the source, such as encouraging loyalty to 
 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 476-77. 
131. Id. at 478. 
132. Id. (quoting Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 546 (5th Cir. 1998)). 
133. Id. at 479-82. 
134. See id. at 485-88. 
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the school and allowing students to bond.FF135FF  The court, however, found this 
to be merely the idea of “aesthetic functionality,” which the court had 
consistently rejected.FF136FF  The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that 
the logos and color schemes did nothing other than identify with the 
school.FF137FF  What made the colors and logos valuable on the T-shirts was the 
fact that it allowed the consumer to identify the product with the school. FF138 
After Smack Apparel, universities can now protect their logos and color 
schemes if they can show secondary meaning under the Lanham Act. FF139FF  
Universities have taken notice and are not afraid to bring legal action if their 
trademarked property is used without authorization. FF140 
IV. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF UNIVERSITY TRADEMARK CASES ILLUSTRATING A 
TREND TOWARD LITIGATION 
Universities have taken a hard line stance in protecting their trademarks 
because “collegiate logos represent[] an estimated licensed retail business 
volume of nearly three billion dollars annually.” FF141FF  It has been speculated 
that more universities will not hesitate to take action to protect intellectual 
property rights.FF142FF  The following cases show that the rights universities hold 
in their intellectual property (e.g., names, color schemes, logos, and 
combinations thereof) have expanded and now protect more than ever.FF143FF   
Even before Qualitex held colors to be potentially under the umbrella of 
copyright law and before Smack Apparel held university color schemes to be 
protectable under trademark law, universities had filed suit to protect their 
intellectual property rights as early as 1983. FF144FF  In University of Notre Dame 
Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., the University of Notre Dame 
(ND) sued a food importer over imported French cheese that bore the name 
“Notre Dame.”FF145FF  Although the court recognized that the name “Notre 
 
135. Id. at 486. 
136. Id. at 487. 
137. Id. at 486. 
138. Id. 
139. Kline, supra note 6, at 59-60. 
140. See Tschura, supra note 1, at 875. 
141. Id.  
142. Jeremy Kahn, School Spirit; Rah, Rah, Rah (It’s Protected), N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2007, at 
4A. 
143. Id. 
144. See Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imp. Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1373-74 
(Fed. Cir. 1983). 
145. Id. at 1373. 
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Dame” was a famous mark identifying the university and also that ND 
marketed a wide variety of products bearing its name, an imported French 
cheese bearing that name would not cause a likelihood of confusion in 
consumers.FF146FF  Further, ND argued that the defendant could not register the 
name “Notre Dame” because it falsely identified the cheese with the 
university.FF147FF  This argument failed, largely because “Notre Dame” was not a 
name solely identifying ND but rather first identifies a religious figure and ND 
could not show that the defendant had used the term with the intent to identify 
the cheese with ND.FF148 
In 1985, the University of Georgia (Georgia) brought suit against a 
novelty beer wholesaler in Georgia.FF149FF  The wholesaler had begun marketing a 
beer that featured a picture of an English bulldog dressed in a red sweater with 
a black “G” on the chest and holding a football, very similar to Georgia‟s 
logo.FF150FF  The beer can also featured the school‟s colors. FF151FF  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Georgia‟s logo, an English 
bulldog wearing a sweater, was at least a suggestive mark, if not an arbitrary 
mark, and, thus, did not require a showing of secondary meaning. FF152FF  
Although the bulldog depicted on the cans was not exactly the same as 
Georgia‟s logo,FF153FF the court stated that “the differences between the two 
[were] so minor as to be legally, if not factually, nonexistent.” FF154FF  This case 
may indicate that some courts will be willing to find trademark infringement 
when the allegedly infringing item is not exactly the same but, in essence, 
conjures up enough similarity in the consumer to cause a likelihood of 
confusion.  Interestingly, it did not seem to matter that the can did contain the 
words, albeit in small lettering, “[n]ot associated with the University of 
Georgia.”FF155 
In 2000, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania decided a case between Villanova University (Villanova) and a 
 
146. Id. at 1374. 
147. Id. at 1375. 
148. Id. at 1377. 
149. Univ. of Ga. Athletic Ass‟n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1536-37 (11th Cir. 1985). 
150. Id. at 1537. 
151. Id. at 1544. 
152. Id. at 1541. 
153. The depiction of the bulldog on the can had a longer tail and a “different kind of sweater.”  
Id. at 1545 n.21.  It also held a beer stein, unlike the University‟s bulldog.  Id. at 1544. 
154. Id. at 1545. 
155. See id. at 1537. 
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Villanova alumni association.FF156FF  This dispute arose when the Villanova 
Alumni Educational Foundation, made up mostly of Villanova alumni, was 
unable to renew an affiliation agreement with Villanova and Villanova 
decided to terminate the affiliation.FF157FF  The alumni association had been in 
existence first to raise money for the Villanova athletic department and later to 
provide financial assistance to non-athlete students.FF158FF  After disaffiliation, the 
alumni association continued to use the name of the school, as well as its 
nickname, the Wildcats, in attempting to raise money over the Internet, 
through mailings, and in person at Villanova football games. FF159FF  Villanova 
sought a preliminary injunction against the alumni association‟s use of the 
school‟s names and logos, and the court granted the preliminary injunction. FF160FF  
Again, the court found the marks “Villanova,” “Wildcats,” and combinations 
thereof were either inherently distinctive or, even if not inherently distinctive, 
they had acquired secondary meaning.FF161FF  Here again, it seemed to be of no 
consequence that the alumni association included language on their 
scholarship applications stating that the association was not affiliated with 
Villanova.FF162FF  The court also held that using Villanova‟s name and nickname 
was not fair use because the use was not merely descriptive.FF163FF  The court 
stated that it would have been fair use had the association used the term 
“Villanova” as a description or identification of club members; however, the 
use here was found not to be used descriptively but in a way deceiving to the 
public and, consequently, was not fair use.FF164 
Lastly, in 2008, the University of Kansas (KU) was involved in a dispute 
over T-shirts using the marks “Phog,” “Fighting Manginos,” “Kivisto Field,” 
“Rock Chalk Jayhawk,” and others.FF165FF  In denying the defendant T-shirt 
maker‟s motion for a judgment as a matter of law, the court stated that each of 
these marks had potentially gained secondary meaning. FF166FF  The court found 
that the term “The Phog” had been used in media guides since the late 1980s 
 
156. Villanova Univ. v. Villanova Alumni Educ. Found., Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 293, 295-97 (E.D. 
Pa. 2000). 
157. Id. at 299-300. 
158. Id. at 296-97, 300. 
159. Id. at 300. 
160. Id. at 301. 
161. Id. at 302-03. 
162. See id. at 300. 
163. Id. at 303. 
164. Id. at 304. 
165. Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1296 (D. Kan. 2008). 
166. Id. at 1296-97. 
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and the term “Rock Chalk Jayhawk” had been used since the 1880s. FF167FF  
“Kivisto Field,” the name of KU‟s football field, was named after the couple 
that donated the money to upgrade the field with permission to use their name, 
and as such, there was enough evidence for a jury to find either inherent 
distinctiveness or secondary meaning.FF168FF  Finally, in regard to the term 
“Fighting Manginos,” the court found that the use of KU‟s football coach‟s 
name with the school colors conveyed the message of affiliation with the 
football team, which could potentially have gained secondary meaning and 
could cause confusion among consumers.FF169FF  This more recent case seems to 
indicate that universities will not hesitate to bring suit over any merchandise 
that may suggest any sort of affiliation with the university.  Not only will 
merchandise containing the school‟s name or logo be attacked but also 
anything that relates to the school, potentially even phrases originally used by 
students, like “Rock Chalk Jayhawk.”FF170FF  It is also important to note when 
examining these cases that it appears that merely one school color alone, like 
the University of North Carolina‟s signature blue, FF171FF will not be enough to 
create the requisite likelihood of confusion for a finding of infringement, 
although it may be theoretically possible if a sufficient showing of acquired 
secondary meaning could be produced.  Rather, for a student‟s use of a 
university mark to be found as infringing, a combination of color schemes or 
colors and logos will be necessary.  
V. THE POTENTIAL FOR INFRINGEMENT IN STUDENT USE OF UNIVERSITY 
MARKS 
Students could potentially be held liable for trademark infringement when 
they make apparel or anything else that uses a school‟s color scheme, 
insignias, or logos.  As the cases laid out above illustrate, universities have not 
hesitated to bring suit over varying uses of school colors, insignias, etc.  
Student use, and use by student groups, of university marks is prevalent, and 
given the aggressiveness of many universities in protecting their intellectual 
property rights, an interesting dilemma arises surrounding potential conflict 
between a university and its students.   
At some universities, student organizations have to obtain university 
 
167. Id. at 1296. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 1297. 
170. Id. at 1296. 
171. See generally University of North Carolina Official Athletic Site, http://tarheelblue.cstv. 
com/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2010).  It is everywhere on their website.  Id. 
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authorization for T-shirt designs if the organizations plan to use the 
university‟s logo.FF172FF  For example, in 2002, student groups at the University 
of Texas (UT) sought equal use of the UT logo. FF173FF  A group had to be backed 
by either the Dean or a UT department to gain use of the logo, and not all 
groups were able to achieve this backing. FF174FF  There appeared to be frustration 
among students, as one student was quoted as saying, “[the UT logo is] an 
identity and an identifier for everyone who goes to school here, on or off the 
field[.]  One person shouldn‟t be able to be a Longhorn more than another.” FF175 
In 2005, the University of Alabama (Alabama) initiated a lawsuit against 
an alumnus who painted depictions of football games and sold them at a 
substantial profit.FF176FF  Alumnus Daniel A. Moore reportedly made millions of 
dollars selling prints of the football portraits he painted. FF177FF  Alabama 
contended that this was an infringing use of its trademarks, including the well-
known Alabama color scheme of crimson and white. FF178FF  A fair amount of 
publicity followed as many people were upset over Alabama‟s filing of the 
lawsuit.FF179FF  The Chattanooga Times Free Press may have summed it up best in 
asking, “[h]ow much control should a university have over a game that is 
played completely in the public domain?”FF180FF  The article goes on to point out 
that Alabama, among others, often seeks press coverage to gain publicity for 
its athletic programs, press coverage that will include game day photos and the 
like.FF181FF  Could this be so different from Moore‟s paintings?  Recently, the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama held that 
Moore‟s paintings did not infringe upon Alabama‟s marks because of 
“defenses premised on Artistic Expression, First Amendment and Fair 
Use.”FF182FF  In an addendum to the opinion, the court stated that “in an analysis 
of the Artistic Expression and First Amendment defenses there has to be a 
balancing of likelihood of confusion with the public interest.” FF183 
 
172. Reinlie, supra note 2. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Magee, supra note 4, at B2. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d. 1238, 1259 (N.D. Ala. 
2009) (emphasis added). 
183. Id. at 1241. 
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In 2007, hundreds of bootleg T-shirts and a substantial amount of cash 
were seized at West Virginia University (WV). FF184FF  University police 
apprehended three individuals from out of state, who were not students, who 
allegedly worked for the same company. FF185FF  WV considered taking legal 
action.FF186FF  Also in 2007, Virginia Tech (VT) was faced with unauthorized 
vendors selling unauthorized merchandise in the wake of the shootings 
suffered on their campus.FF187FF  In 2008, political expression came into play at 
KU when a Democratic group on the campus made several T-shirts in support 
of presidential candidate Barack Obama, which read, “Barack Chalk 
Jayhawk.”FF188FF  Permission was given by KU for T-shirts to be distributed only 
among members of the group, but controversy arose when a photograph 
emerged of the Kansas governor with one of the T-shirts.FF189FF  The athletic 
department went on to forbid any more T-shirts from being made, as there was 
concern it would look like KU was supporting Barack Obama, and 
representatives of KU expressed regret for authorizing the T-shirts in the first 
place.FF190FF  This case illustrates an interesting issue of political speech using 
university marks. 
Student-made T-shirts and the like may not have the exact color scheme, 
but together with insignias and logos, it appears much of student-made 
memorabilia would pass the tests for likelihood of confusion and infringement 
when looked at in the light of recent case law. FF191FF  It seems that any use of 
phraseology, colors, or insignias need only be enough to invoke a university‟s 
marks to be infringing; they need not be exact copies or replicas. FF192FF  Like the 
bulldog on a beer can, it seems that a small degree of difference between the 
marks will not preclude a finding of infringement. FF193 
 
184. Kellen Henry, DPS Seizes T-shirts From Unauthorized Vendors, DAILY ATHENAEUM 
(Univ. of W.V.) via U-Wire, Oct. 2, 2007, available at http://www.thedaonline.com/dps-seizes-t-
shirts-from-unauthorized-vendors-1.691371. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. Angela Manese-Lee, Licensing Office Fights Use of Unauthorized Logos; Virginia, 
ROANOKE TIMES, Apr. 26, 2007, at A11. 
188. Obama T-shirt, supra note 3, at 1. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. See Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 488-89 (5th 
Cir. 2008); Univ. of Ga. Athletic Ass‟n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11th Cir. 1985); Univ. of Notre 
Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imp. Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Univ. of 
Kan. v. Sinks, 644 F. Supp. 2d, 1287, 1296 (D. Kan. 2008); Villanova Univ. v. Villanova Alumni 
Educ. Found., 123 F. Supp. 2d 293, 299-301 (E.D. Pa. 2000). 
192. See Laite, 756 F.2d at 1544-45. 
193. Id. 
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If a university were to bring an action against a student or group of 
students, it does not appear that vicarious liability would be a viable theory for 
the university to recover under.  It is difficult to see how a university would be 
able to prove that one person had the “right and ability to supervise the 
activity.”FF194FF  It seems that it would be difficult to show that any one student 
had any supervisory authority over any other student.  Similarly, it is hard to 
see how the theory of respondeat superior would apply, as it is not likely that 
any student involved in the production of infringing materials would be 
considered an employee.FF195FF  However, if a group of students were ambitious 
enough to produce and sell memorabilia on a grander scale, then it seems 
feasible that one or more students may take on a role akin to a manager in a 
business, thereby opening the door to potential vicarious liability.FF196FF  Also, the 
students involved may come closer to fitting into an employer/employee 
relationship—not with the university but, rather, among one another.  This 
would potentially bring a larger group of students into the realm of potential 
liability. 
Students may also face contributory liability for assisting other students 
who are directly infringing.FF197FF  An easy example to imagine would be a 
student working at a screen-printing facility or with access to the materials 
needed, printing university trademarks on T-shirts for students he or she 
knows will be selling for a profit.  In this case, the screen-printing student 
would be intentionally assisting another in infringing, assuming he or she 
knew what was going on, and the student would not have any power over the 
party who is directly infringing.  A showing of these two elements may be 
enough to hold that student liable for contributory infringement. FF198FF  Again, if 
a group of students began producing on a grander scale, more doors to 
contributory liability may open, especially if they were to continue after a 
university was to take notice and give them warning.FF199 
Finally, a university may be less likely to pursue an infringement action 
against a single student or smaller number of students, but universities have 
shown an aggressive stance on combating infringement. FF200FF  It may be that we 
 
194. Microsoft Corp. v. Ram Distribution, LLC, 625 F. Supp. 2d 674, 684 (E.D. Wis. 2008). 
195. See Buckman, supra note 10, at 590. 
196. See Microsoft Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d at 684. 
197. See id. 
198. Id. 
199. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). 
200. See Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 488-89 (5th 
Cir. 2008); Univ. of Ga. Athletic Ass‟n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1536-37 (11th Cir. 1985); Univ. of 
Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imp. Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Univ. 
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have not yet seen what number of students or infringing items will be 
necessary for a university to take notice.  Likely, it will differ from case to 
case and particular circumstances of each use.  Alabama went after a single 
alumnus, but in that case, the alumnus had profited to the tune of over a 
million dollars by painting and selling depictions of university football 
games.FF201FF  It seems that a student painting his or her skin in school colors will 
not draw the ire of a school‟s watchdogs, but as we have seen, a group of 
students printing up some T-shirts to show school spirit, or to make a point, 
without authorization, may provoke legal action by the university. 
VI. POSSIBLE DEFENSES FOR STUDENT USES OF UNIVERSITY MARKS 
If a university were to bring suit, the offending students may have a strong 
defense.  Students may be able to claim fair use as a defense, either classic fair 
use,FF202FF nominative fair use,FF203FF or expressive use.FF204FF  As discussed earlier, 
classic fair use requires that the mark be used descriptively, not as a mark, 
fairly, and in good faith.FF205FF  In the case of student use of university 
trademarks, the mark would be used as a mark because it would likely be 
intended to identify the particular university.  In determining if the mark was 
used fairly, the high potential for confusion would likely weigh against a 
finding that the mark was indeed used fairly.FF206FF   
As for nominative fair use, the student‟s use of the university‟s mark will 
not be necessary to describe both the student‟s product and the university‟s 
product, as both will be virtually identical in that they will be using the same 
colors, names, and logos.  Student use will likely be using university 
trademarks in the same way the university uses them, simply to identify the 
university.  Because of this, both classic and nominative fair use will likely not 
apply.FF207 
A broad interpretation of the expressive use defense might make any 
student-made product a mere expression, rather than an infringing use. FF208FF  
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Expressive use would seem to apply to cases where the use is intended to 
convey a message, as in the example of the “Barack Chalk Jayhawk” T-shirts 
at KU.FF209FF  It would seem that expressive use would not apply if a student 
made T-shirts or anything else that simply contained the university‟s name or 
logo because this would not convey anything in addition to merely source 
identification, which is what a school‟s name and logo are intended to do.  
Also, this sort of use does not seem to conform with ideals of First 
Amendment free speech because there is no criticism or putting forth of new 
ideas.FF210FF  However, there seems to be a grey area between a use that delves 
into politics, for example, and a use that criticizes something within the 
university.  A use like inserting a presidential candidate‟s name into a school 
slogan seems to articulate something beyond simply identifying the university 
as a source, but what about a T-shirt criticizing the school‟s football coach?  
Another example from KU, namely the “Fighting Manginos,” seems to say no 
expressive use.FF211FF  If a student were to make a T-shirt criticizing another 
university‟s team or coach it would likely find the same fate. FF212FF  Also, an 
expressive use defense will likely not work for student made items 
“celebrating” a team‟s participation in a Bowl Game, the Final Four, or any 
other similar event.FF213FF  It seems that there is a continuum of expressive use 
here with what may be called purely expressive use, like the Obama T-shirt 
example, at one end and pure indication of origin at the other end.  It seems 
unclear at what point on that continuum an indication of origin sufficiently 
passes into expressive use so that the use is no longer infringing.   
Public policy would seem to favor giving students some leeway on this 
continuum.  Given the increasing costs of tuition that students are paying to 
attend these universities,FF214FF it seems reasonable to allow these students some 
room to express themselves and their passions by using the university‟s marks, 
to a degree.  After all, it is the students who are fervently supporting their 
school and packing the arenas and stadiums. FF215FF  It might be possible that, if a 
student came up with a clever idea using a university mark, the university and 
student could work together, possibly by allowing the student a license to use 
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the mark.  Of course, if the use was offensive to the school, the university 
should be able to deny the license, and expressive use likely would not apply 
because a simply offensive use probably will not articulate a message.  If the 
use did convey a message, then expressive use may come into play.FF216 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Trademark law protects university color schemes and insignias from 
infringement.  Student-made memorabilia would likely be considered 
infringing, based on the tests used to determine infringement.  If a university 
were to pursue an action against a student or group of students for trademark 
infringement, it is likely that the use will be an infringement unless the student 
can find a viable defense.  
As demonstrated, in a case like this, should a university decide to bring an 
action, the student‟s best defense will likely be to argue for expressive use.  
This argument will also potentially be forced to incorporate public policy 
arguments that, in most cases, it would be unreasonable for a school to pursue 
an action against a student for a use of a trademark.  Universities have a right 
to protect their intellectual property rights but maybe not at the expense of 
relatively minor uses by the universities‟ own students. 
Michael C. Shull
*
F 
  
 
 
 
216. McGeveran, supra note 108, at 54. 
*
 Michael Shull is a May 2011 Marquette University Law School graduate where he also earned 
a Certificate in Sports Law from the National Sports Law Institute.  Michael is a 2007 graduate of the 
University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh, where he earned his B.S. in Philosophy.  Michael serveed as the 
2010-11 Comment Editor of the Marquette Sports Law Review.  
